Quantum mechanics may be formulated as Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) so that it contains nothing probabilistic except conscious perceptions. Sets of these perceptions can be deterministically realized with measures given by expectation values of positive-operator-valued awareness operators. Ratios of the measures for these sets of perceptions can be interpreted as frequencytype probabilities for many actually existing sets. These probabilities generally cannot be given by the ordinary quantum "probabilities" for a single set of alternatives. Probabilism, or ascribing probabilities to unconscious aspects of the world, may be seen to be an aesthemamorphic myth.
Introduction
Probabilities are the most mysterious aspect of quantum mechanics, in my mind.
There is first the mystery of which amplitudes should be squared to give probabilities. Should it be the amplitudes of "measurement outcomes"? If so, what constitutes a "measurement"? Should it be the amplitudes of all "events," whether or not they is "measured"? If "events" are represented by projection operators, should one just calculate them for one set that commutes and adds up to the identity operator? If so, which such set of "events" should one choose? Should one instead calculate probabilities for "histories"? If so, which set of "histories" should one choose?
There is second the even deeper mystery of what the resulting probabilities mean. One interpretation is that they are "propensities" for certain "possibilities" to be "actualized." In this interpretation a unique one of the possible "measurement outcomes," "events," or "histories" actually occurs, with the probability assigned to it by quantum mechanics, and the other possibilities do not. But then what chooses the set of "measurement outcomes," "events," or "histories"? For example, if it is the set of events given by a set of commuting rank-one projection operators onto an orthonormal basis for the Hilbert space of states, what determines this basis? Furthermore, once the set is chosen so that the quantum-mechanical probabilities can be determined from the state, what is it that actually determines which "possibility" from that set is "actualized"? If the probabilities of quantum mechanics are interpreted in this propensity sense as indicating fundamental uncertainties, then quantum mechanics itself would be uncertain and incapable of being a complete theory of the universe in which only certain possibilities are actualized.
The last question above, but not the two preceding it, can be avoided by taking the alternative interpretation that probabilities are "frequencies" for many "actualities." This is a "many-worlds" interpretation [1] . If the set of possibilities (now all considered to be actualities, at least all those possibilities with nonzero frequency-type probabilities) were determined, and if this many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics were a true representation of the universe, then this quantum mechanical theory would be definite and complete, for it would completely specify the frequency of all actualities.
Of course, there is the technical problem of interpreting the probabilities as frequencies of a finite integral number of actualities if any of the probabilities are irrational numbers, but one can circumvent that difficulty by interpreting the probabilities as ratios of measures of a continuum of actualities (though perhaps at the cost of no longer having a clear intuitive grasp of the concept in terms of familiar objects, but that should be no fundamental difficulty, other than for one's intuition).
However, there still remains within this many-worlds quantum theory the unresolved question of what the set of actualities is. This certainly does not make the many-worlds interpretation worse then those with a propensity interpretation of the probabilities, but since those other interpretations have the even more basic problem of not saying which possibilities are actualized, it is often overlooked that they also share with the many-worlds interpretation the more subtle problem of which set of possibilities (actualities in the many-worlds interpretation) is picked out.
Here I shall summarize a version of quantum mechanics called Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] in which not only are probabilities frequencies (or, more precisely, ratios of measures of sets) rather than propensities, but also probabilities apply only to conscious perceptions. The unconscious aspect of our universe (here called the quantum world) is completely described by the quantum state and its complex amplitudes (the expectation values of all operators, which obey some algebra which is also characteristic of the quantum world). The measures in the conscious world are given by a subset of these amplitudes, the expectation values of a certain preferred set of positive awareness operators.
In Sensible Quantum Mechanics, probabilism, or interpreting the unconscious quantum world itself probabilistically, is an aesthemamorphic myth (from the Greek αισθησισ: perception, sense, sensation), rather analogous to the myth of animism that ascribes living properties to inanimate objects. It may be a convenient myth, just as animism is a when we say such things as, "Water seeks its own level," but it would give us a better understanding if we recognized it as a myth. Thus probabilities don't (apply to) "matter"; they are only in the "mind."
Also in SQM, the quantum state never collapses. All sets of perceptions with positive measure (given by the expectation values of different awareness operators in the single unchanged Heisenberg state of the universe) actually occur, so the theory is probabilistic not in the propensity sense but only in the sense of "frequencies" (as ratios of the measures of the sets): it is a many-perceptions theory.
The measure of sets of perceptions in the conscious world permits a test in principle of whether a perception is typical. The Weak Anthropic Principle can be generalized to the Conditional Aesthemic Principle: our conscious perceptions are likely to be typical perceptions in the conscious world with its measure.
Axioms of Sensible Quantum Mechanics
Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) is given by the following three fundamental postulates [4] :
Quantum World Axiom: The unconscious "quantum world" Q is completely described by an appropriate algebra of operators and by a suitable state σ (a positive linear functional of the operators) giving the expectation value
Conscious World Axiom: The "conscious world" M, the set of all perceptions p, has a fundamental measure µ(S) for each subset S of M.
Quantum-Consciousness Connection: The measure µ(S) for each set S of conscious perceptions is given by the expectation value of a corresponding "awareness operator" A(S), a positive-operator-valued (POV) measure [7] , in the state σ of the quantum world:
Here a perception p is the entirety of a single conscious experience, all that one is consciously aware of or consciously experiencing at one moment, the total "raw feel" that one has at one time, or [8] Since all sets S of perceptions with µ(S) > 0 really occur in SQM, it is completely deterministic if the quantum state and the A(S) are determined: there are no random or truly probabilistic elements. Nevertheless, because SQM has measures for sets of perceptions, one can readily calculate ratios that can be interpreted as conditional probabilities. For example, one can consider the set of perceptions S 1 in which there is a conscious memory of having tossed a coin fifty times, and the set S 2 in which there is a conscious memory of getting less than ten heads. Then one can interpret
as the conditional probability that the perception is in the set S 2 , given that it is in the set S 1 , that is, that a perception included a conscious memory of getting less than ten heads, given that it included a conscious memory of having tossed a coin fifty times.
In SQM the set M of all perceptions is basic, and one can choose out of this set any subset S (by, e.g., the contents of the perceptions p themselves, or else by properties of the corresponding awareness operator A(S) of the subset S), but there is no absolutely preferred equivalence between perceptions that could be used to classify them uniquely (except in ad hoc ways) into sets corresponding to individual persons or minds. Of course, just as one can for objects such as "chairs" or "protons" that also presumably do not have fundamental definitions in the ultimate theory of the universe, one can make up ad hoc definitions that may be very good in practice for classifying perceptions into persons or minds. But that classification is not fundamental to SQM. As Hume [9] wrote, "what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity." Since perceptions (or what might crudely be called sensations) are basic to SQM, but not groupings of them into minds, one might call SQM Mindless Sensationalism.
Testing and Comparing SQM Theories
Since physics should be rooted in experience, we should have a way to test and compare different candidate SQM theories. If one had a theory in which only a small subset of the set of all possible perceptions is predicted to occur, one could simply check whether an experienced perception is in that subset. If it is not, that would be clear evidence against that theory. Unfortunately, in almost all SQM theories, almost all sets of perceptions are predicted to have a positive measure, so these theories cannot be excluded so simply. For such many-perceptions theories, the best one can hope for seems to be to find likelihood evidence for or against it. Even how to do this is not immediately obvious, since SQM theories merely give measures for sets of perceptions rather than the existence probabilities for any perceptions (unless the existence probabilities are considered to be unity for all existing sets of perceptions, i.e., all those with nonzero measure, but this is of little help, since almost all sets exist in this sense).
In order to test and compare SQM theories, it helps to hypothesize that the set M of all possible conscious perceptions p is a suitable topological space with a prior measure
Then, because of the linearity of positive-valued-operator measures over sets, one can write each awareness operator as
a generalized sum or integral of "experience operators" or "perception operators" E(p) for the individual perceptions p in the set S. Similarly, one can write the measure on a set of perceptions S as
in terms of a measure density m(p) that is the quantum expectation value of the experience operator E(p) for the same perception p:
Now one can test the agreement of a particular SQM theory with a conscious observation or perception p by calculating the typicality T (p) that the theory assigns to the perception: Let S ≤ (p) be the set of perceptions
For p fixed andp chosen randomly with the infinitesimal measure dµ(p), the probability that T (p) is less than or equal to T (p) is
Thus the typicality T i (p) of a perception p is the probability in a particular SQM theory or hypothesis H i that another random perception will have its typicality less than or equal to that of p itself. One can interpret it as the likelihood of the perception p in the particular theory H i , not for p to exist, which is usually unity (interpreting all perceptions p with m(p) > 0 as existing), but for p to have a measure density, and hence a typicality, no larger than it has. Once the typicality T i (p) can be calculated for an experienced perception assuming the theory H i , one approach is to use it to rule out or falsify the theory if the resulting typicality is too low. Another approach is to assign prior probabilities P (H i ) to different theories (presumably neither propensities nor frequencies but rather purely subjective probabilities, perhaps one's guess for the "propensities" for God to create a universe according to the various theories), say
where n i is the rank of H i in order of increasing complexity (my present favorite choice for a countably infinite set of hypotheses if I could do this ranking, which is another problem I will not further consider here). Then one can use Bayes' rule to calculate the posterior probability of the theory H i given the perception p as
There is the potential technical problem that one might assign nonzero prior probabilities to hypotheses H i in which the total measure µ(M) for all perceptions is not finite, so that the right side of Eq. (7) may have both numerator and denominator infinite, which makes the typicality T i (p) inherently ambiguous. To avoid this problem, one might use, instead of T i (p) in Eq. (10), rather
for some set of perceptions S containing p that has µ i (S) finite for each hypothesis H i . This is related to a practical limitation anyway, since one could presumably only hope to be able to compare the measure densities m(p) for some small set of perceptions rather similar to one's own, though it is not clear in quantum cosmological theories that allow an infinite amount of inflation how to get a finite measure even for a small set of perceptions [6] . Unfortunately, even if one can get a finite measure by suitably restricting the set S, this makes the resulting P (H i |p; S) depend on this chosen S as well as on the other postulated quantities such as P (H i ).
Properties of Experience Operators
Once one has a bare quantum theory (algebra of operators and quantum state) for the quantum world, and the set M of possible perceptions p with a prior measure for integrating any measure density m(p) by Eq. (5) to get the corresponding measure µ(S) for sets S of perceptions p, the remaining feature of SQM to be determined is the experience or perception operators E(p), whose expectation values give the measure density by Eq. (6) . Assuming that the framework of SQM is correct and that one knows what the set of possible perceptions is, the uncertainty of the E(p) encapsulates our ignorance of how the quantum world produces conscious perceptions.
(One might object that even if we knew the full SQM theory with all the E(p)'s, we would still not know how the quantum world produces conscious perceptions. This would be like saying that even if we have a law for electromagnetism, we would still not know how a charged particle produces an electromagnetic field. But if we can say what perceptions or what fields are produced in whatever various circumstances that may occur, this is about as good an understanding as we can hope to get in physics, though of course we would hope for the simplest description so that we can describe as many things as possible with a small number of general principles.)
In [4] a large number of hypotheses were given (some compatible with each other, but most incompatible alternatives) for the experience or perception operators E(p). Here I shall not repeat most of them but shall simply note that the the strongest one I am presently fairly comfortable with (though without high confidence that it is true) is the Commuting Projection Hypothesis of SQMPC: E(p) = P (p), a projection operator depending upon the perception p, with [P (p), P (p ′ )] = 0 for all pairs of perceptions p and p ′ . In many cases I would also think it might a plausibly good idealization to make the Assumption of Perception Components, that each perception p itself consists of a set of discrete components c i (p) contained within the perception, say p = {c i (p)}. Then I would think that, at least as a reasonably good approximation, one might strengthen the Commuting Projection Hypothesis of SQMPC to the Commuting Product Projection Hypothesis of SQMPPC: Then, although it is by no means required in SQM and indeed might be misleading in circumstances in which these hypotheses do not hold, one might find it heuristically advantageous to say that if the quantum state of the universe is represented by the pure state |ψ , one can ascribe to the perception p the pure Everett "relative state"
Alternatively, if the quantum state of the universe is represented by the density matrix ρ, one can associate the perception with a relative density matrix
Then if one is willing to say that m(p) = T r[E(p)ρ] is the absolute probability for the perception p (which might seem natural at least when E(p) is a projection operator, though I am certainly not advocating this naïve interpretation), one might also naïvely interpret T r[E(p ′ )ρ p ] as the conditional probability of the perception p ′ given the perception p.
Another thing one can do with two perceptions p and p ′ is to calculate an "overlap fraction" between them as
If the quantum state of the universe is pure, this is the same as the overlap probability between the two Everett relative states corresponding to the perceptions:
Thus one might in some sense say that if f (p, p ′ ) is near unity, the two perceptions are in nearly the same one of the Everett "many worlds," but if f (p, p ′ ) is near zero, the two perceptions are in nearly orthogonal different worlds. However, this is just a manner of speaking, since I do not wish to say that the quantum state of the universe is really divided up into many different worlds. In a slightly different way of putting it, one might also propose that f (p, p ′ ), instead of T r[E(p ′ )ρ p ], be interpreted as the conditional probability of the perception p ′ given the perception p. Still, I do not see any evidence that f (p, p ′ ) should be interpreted as a fundamental element of Sensible Quantum Mechanics. In any case, one can be conscious only of a single perception at once, so there is no way in principle that one can test any properties of joint perceptions such as f (p, p ′ ).
Perceptions of Schrödinger's Cat
The framework of Sensible quantum mechanics allows one to discuss questions of what one would be perceived in the experiment of Schrödinger's cat [10] , and a detailed SQM theory would answer such questions. One such question is whether one could directly perceive a superposition of, say, alive plus dead.
If perceptions are of alive (A) versus dead (D), so E(p alive ) ∝ |A A| and E(p dead ) ∝ |D D| , then in an appropriate basis for this the quantum state resulting from the idealized Schrödinger's cat experiment may have the form |ψ ∝ |A head |A body |A rest + |D head |D body |D rest + (other terms),
where I have conceptually divided the system (e.g., the universe) into the head of the cat, the body of the cat, and the rest of the universe. Here "(other terms)" denotes other components of the quantum state in which the Schrödinger's cat experiment has not been done and there is no perception that it has; I shall here ignore the other irrelevant perceptions whose measure arises from such terms. One now finds that in this idealized state there is an equal nonzero measure density for the perceptions p head alive, body alive,. . . and p head dead, body dead,. . . , but no measure density for p head alive, body dead,. . . or p head dead, body alive,. . . . In other words, there is not a unique perception of whether the cat is alive or dead, but in each perception that the experiment has been done (given by part of the unspecified perception components denoted by the . . . in the subscripts for the p's), there is perfect agreement that the head and body are either both alive or both dead. In this case one one gets equal measure densities for all four possible perceptions p ++ , p −− , p +− , and p −+ , so only 2 −1 of the perceptions agree about the head and body.
If one had instead conceptually divided the cat into n > 2 parts which were all either dead or alive, then if perception components were of that property (dead or alive), there would be, in the idealized Schrödinger's cat experiment, just as in the n = 2 case above, no single perception of whether the cat or any of its parts were dead or alive, but within each perception there would be total agreement between the perception components of whether each part of the cat were dead or alive, so there would be no confusion within any single multi-component perception. On the other hand, if perception components were of the + and − properties of each part of the cat, all possible 2 n orders would occur with equal weight, so only a fraction of 2 1−n of the perceptions would have agreement for all n parts of the cat., and in the remaining bulk of the perceptions there would be confusion as to whether the entire cat is dead or alive.
Note that without knowing what the experience operators actually are, this analysis cannot answer the question of how each part of the cat is perceived. However, it does show that if the perception is to give agreement between the components corresponding to the different parts of the cat, and if (as in the idealized Schrödinger's cat experiment) there is a complete correlation between the parts as to whether they are alive or dead, then the perception components should be of whether the corresponding part of the cat is alive or dead, rather than being of the linear combinations + or −. This does seem to fit our experience much better than the other possibility, so empirically we can say that we tend to have relatively unconfused perceptions, at least compared to the maximum confusion conceivable. There is still the mystery of why this is so, and I am tempted to paraphrase Einstein to say, "The most confusing thing about perceptions is that they are not generally confusing."
One possible attempt at an explanation is to argue that if our perceptions were confused, we would not respond coherently to our environment and so would not survive. However, this assumes that our perceptions really do affect our actions (e.g., part of the quantum state) rather than just being passively produced by the quantum state as epiphenomena. SQM describes only the production of perceptions (i.e., the determination of their measure) by the quantum state and the awareness or experience operators but does not describe any action of the perceptions back on the state. If the state were really unaffected by the perceptions, and if the survival of organisms can be described by the properties of the state, then this survival would be totally unaffected by the perceptions, and, in particular, by whether they are confused or unconfused. Of course, there may be some other explanation of the coherence of perceptions besides the survival value for an organism, but the attractiveness of that particular explanation does at least suggest that perceptions do have an action back on the quantum state. Another suggestive argument for the same conclusion, and a sketch of how this back reaction might fit in with the presently known laws of physics, will be given near the end of this paper.
Location and Time of Perceptions in QFT
In general, perceptions p are associated with experience operators E(p) (or sets of perceptions with awareness operators A(S)), but not with times or locations. Instead, Sensible Quantum Mechanics transcends quantum theories in which space and time are fundamental.
But for quantum field theory (QFT) in a classical curved globally hyperbolic background spacetime without symmetries (so that points can be uniquely identified by the background), one can make an ad hoc definition of a time and location associated with a perception p: Choose a one-parameter (time t) sequence of Cauchy hypersurfaces. For each time t, point P on the hypersurface, and radius r, let E ′ (p; t, P, r) be E(p) written in terms of the fields and conjugate momenta at t but with terms at distances greater than r from the point P truncated. Define
r(p, t, P ) = min [r :
r(p; t) = min [r(p; t, P ) : P on hypersurface of time t],
P (p; t) = P such that F (p; t, P, r(p; t)) = 1/2, (20)
This locates the perception as crudely occurring mostly within the smallest possible ball of geodesic radius r p from the point P p on the hypersurface at time t p .
Questions and Speculations
One can use the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics to ask questions and make speculations that might be difficult otherwise:
1. What regions (presumably inside brains) are most responsible for perceptions? 2. Does the region depend significantly on the character of the perception? 3. Can one have two quite different perceptions, p and p ′ , with f (p, p ′ ) ≈ 1 (i.e., in nearly the "same Everett world"), t p = t p ′ (i.e., most localized at the same times), and with both P p and P p ′ in the same brain? We generally believe this is possible for two different brains, but can one single brain have two different perceptions (and not just two different components of a single perception) at once? 4. If so, can the two balls of radius r p and r p ′ overlap? (I.e., can the same region of the brain have two different perceptions at once?) 5. How does the measure density m(p) depend on brain characteristics? 6. Is it correlated with intelligence, so that in some sense brighter brains give a larger measure of perceptions?
7. Does this explain why you perceive yourself as human rather than insect, although there are many more insects than humans?
8. Does this explain why you may perceive yourself as more intelligent than most other people? (In other words, are you more typical, when weighted by the measure for perceptions, than you might otherwise have thought ?) 9. Can electronic computers give significant measures for perceptions? 10. Are human brains more efficient than most electronic computers, no matter how intelligent (at least in information-processing capabilities), in producing conscious perceptions? (If so, the measure for perceptions would not be correlated purely with intelligence in this sense.)
11. Does this explain why you do not perceive yourself as one of trillions of self-replicating computers that might colonize the Galaxy?
12. Over what region of spacetime do human brains have the dominant measure of conscious perceptions in our Everett world ρ p ?
The Conditional Aesthemic Principle would predict that our conscious perceptions are likely to be typical perceptions in the conscious world with its measure. Thus it would predict that it is unlikely that the overwhelming bulk of conscious perceptions in the universe would have a measure density (and hence a typicality) larger than ours, though of course it allows for the possibility that many other types of perceptions could have comparable measure densities and typicalities, so it does not predict that the dominant perceptions should be peculiarly human.
An Analogy for the Mind-Body Problem
To explain the mind-body relation in Sensible Quantum mechanics in terms of an analogy, consider a classical model of spinless massive point charged particles and an electromagnetic field in Minkowski spacetime. The charged particles can be considered to be analogous to the quantum world (or the quantum state part of it), and the electromagnetic field can be considered to be analogous to the conscious world (the set of perceptions with its measure µ(S)).
At the level of a simplistic materialist mind-body philosophy, one might merely say that the electromagnetic field is part of, or perhaps a property of, the material particles. One cannot say for certain that this is wrong, but it does not lead to much understanding of the electromagnetic field merely to say that. Similarly, one cannot rule out the claim that consciousness is merely a property of the quantum world, but just saying that does not give much insight into consciousness.
At the level of Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the charged particle worldlines are the analogue of the quantum state, the retarded electromagnetic field propagator (Coulomb's law in the nonrelativistic approximation) is the analogue of the awareness operators, and the electromagnetic field determined by the worldlines of the charged particles and by the retarded propagator is the analogue of the conscious world. (Here one can see that this analogue of Sensible Quantum Mechanics is valid only if there is no free incoming electromagnetic radiation.)
One might propose an extension of Sensible Quantum Mechanics, say Sensational Quantum Mechanics, in which the conscious world may affect the quantum world. The analogue of this would be the case in which the charged particle worldlines are partially determined by the electromagnetic field through the change in the action it causes. (This more unified framework better explains the previous level but does not violate its description, which simply had the particle worldlines given.) (A motivation for considering the possibility that the conscious world might have an effect on the quantum world, besides the actual effect in the electromagnetic analogue being considered here, was given at the end of the section above on the experiment of Schrödinger's cat. Another motivation which occurred to me earlier would be the desire to explain the correlation between will and action, i.e., why I feel I do as I please. An easy way to circumvent the objection that such an effect would violate the known laws of physics, in particular those of energy-momentum conservation, would be to have desires in the conscious world affect, in a coordinateinvariant way that would thus preserve energy-momentum conservation, the action functional that is used in a path integral giving the quantum state.)
At a yet higher level in the analogue, there is the possibility of incoming free electromagnetic waves, which would violate the previous frameworks that assumed the electromagnetic field was uniquely determined by the charged particle worldlines. An analogous suggestion for intrinsic degrees of freedom for consciousness has been made by Linde [11] .
Finally, at a still higher level, there might be an even more unifying framework in which both charged particles and the electromagnetic field are seen as modes of a single entity (e.g., to take a popular current speculation, a superstring). Such a more unified framework for the mind-body problem might exist as well, but I suspect that one will not get to such a framework with any significant content without examining the lower levels first and then hopefully finding a complete unified description from which the lower levels can be shown to emerge by some sort of reduction or approximation.
Thus Sensible Quantum Mechanics may be only a framework for the next step in understanding the relation between mind and body or between conscious observations and quantum mechanics. However, it does seem to give a glimpse of a yet-to-be-completed quantum theory that, when filled in in detail, could not be criticized for being inherently incomplete in not predicting precisely what happens during observations. I perceive that my thoughts on this subject have benefited by interactions with many people listed in my more complete account in [4] , but here I especially want to acknowledge the continued e-mail interaction with my previous co-author Shelly Goldstein [12] (whom I shall first meet in person only after writing these words). Financial support has been provided by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
